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Appellant Cable One, Inc. ("Cable One"), by its attorneys, hereby submits its Reply Brief
in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c).
INTRODUCTION

There is no basis in the law or the record of this case to justify the District Court's
decision, and the Tax Commission fails to provide any legal or factual support for the District
Court's conclusions. Cable One's cost of performance analysis was conducted in accordance
with Idaho statutory and regulatory requirements and consistent with similar laws in other
jurisdictions. The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates that Cable One incurred more
costs to provide Internet access services in 2005 due to activities outside of Idaho. As such,
under well-established tax law principles in Idaho and other jurisdictions, income from the sale
of those services is not subject to Idaho income tax. This Court should reverse the District
Court's legal errors and set aside its erroneous factual findings.
This Court also should fmd that alternative apportionment is not available here as a
matter of law. There is no basis for the Tax Commission's proposal to apply the relief remedy of
alternative apportionment, and the Tax Commission has not met its high burden to overcome the
very strong presumption in favor of the normal three-factor allocation and apportionment
method. Cable One's calculation of its income tax liability in accordance with Idaho law does
not lead to the type of extreme, disproportional results that might justify alternative
apportionment. Cable One's results are in accord with Idaho law and with the tax treatment of
other similarly-situated Idaho taxpayers. The Tax Commission has failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating otherwise.
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ARGUMENT

The weight of the evidence below demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Cable
One's costs to provide Internet access service were incurred outside ofIdaho, and that Cable One
correctly excluded its Internet access service sales income from the Idaho sales factor numerator
as required under I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2).

The evidence also demonstrates that the Tax

Commission has not met its high burden to apply an alternative allocation and apportionment to
Cable One under I.C. § 63-3027(s). If the Tax Commission believes a change in Idaho tax law is
necessary, its sole recourse is the legislature, as only that body can make law. Mead v. Arnell,
117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990); see also IDAHO CONS. art. III, §§ 1, 15; Berry v.

Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1961) ("The wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone."). It is incumbent upon this Court
to enforce Idaho tax statutes as written by giving effect to the intent of the legislature. Idaho

State Tax Comm 'n v. Haener Bros., 121 Idaho 741, 743, 828 P.2d 304, 306 (1992); Bogner v.
State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, State Tax Comm 'n, 107 Idaho 854, 856, 693 P.2d 1056,
1058 (1984). But to the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statute or the Tax Commission's
implementing rules, it must be resolved in Cable One's favor. See, e.g., Canty v. Idaho State Tax

Comm 'n, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P.3d 983, 987 (2002) ("Where an ambiguity is found in tax
statutes, the statutes are generally 'strictly construed against the taxing authority and in favor of
the taxpayer and ambiguities therein are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. "') (quoting

Dep't of Employment v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 96 Idaho 386, 387, 529 P.2d 782, 783 (1974));
Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 420, 247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011)
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("Administrative rules are interpreted the same way as statutes."). The District Court's decision
is not supported by substantial and competent evidence and relies on "a strained and harsh
interpretation o[ f] a series of statutes that otherwise have a plain, obvious, and rational meaning."
J.R. Simp/at Co., v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 863-64, 820 P.2d 1206, 1220-21
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court's decision is both factually and
legally incorrect, and must be reversed.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DEFINING CABLE ONE'S INCOMEPRODUCING ACTIVITY
Both parties agree that the first step in determining a taxpayer's income tax liability is to

properly define the income-producing activity in question. Tax Commission Br. at 11; Cable
One Br. at 13. The District Court erred when it determined that the income-producing activity in
this case was Cable One's "attracting and servicing Idaho Internet access customers." (Conc. of
Law 11, R. 000343 (emphasis added)). This fundamental error infects the whole of the District
Court's analysis and is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The evidence
below and applicable law make it clear that Cable One's income-producing activity is properly
defined as the sale of Internet access service across its entire 19-state cable television broadband
network. l
During 2005, the tax year at issue in this case, Cable One's operations spanned 48 cable
systems in 19 states. (Joint Stip. of Exhibits and Facts, R. 000279). Cable One's operations
currently consist of 45 cable systems in 18 states. For consistency, Cable One refers herein to its
operations as they existed in 2005.

-3-
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A.

The District Court Ignored the Plain Language of the Statute and the Rules
for Defining Cable One's Income-Producing Activity

Idaho law requires multistate corporations transacting business both within and without
the state ofIdaho to engage in allocation and apportionment. I.C. § 63-3027(b). Cable One is a
multistate business and its business income is taxable both inside and outside of Idaho. Cable
One's income-producing activity or separate item of income at issue here - sales of Internet
access service - is "performed both in and outside" of Idaho, which triggers the requirement that
Cable One conduct a cost of performance analysis pursuant I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2).
The District Court's definition of Cable One's income-producing activity does not
comport with the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State
Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1,5,855 P.2d 462, 466 (1993) ("Statutory interpretation always begins
with an examination of the literal words of the statute. When construing a statute, we give the
language contained in the statute its plain, obvious and rational meanings. Words and phrases of
a statute are construed according to context.") (internal citations omitted).

If Cable One's

income-producing activity were limited to "attracting and servicing Idaho Internet access
customers" as ruled by the District Court, there would be no need to engage in any analysis
under I.C. § 63-3027(r). (Cone. of Law 11, R. 000343 (emphasis added)). When an "incomeproducing activity is performed in [Idaho]," the sales automatically are considered to be in Idaho
and no further analysis is necessary. I.e. § 63-3027(r)(1). By contrast, when an "incomeproducing activity is performed both in and outside [Idaho]," a cost of performance analysis is
required to determine whether the sales should be included in Idaho. I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2). Cable

-4-
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One's multi state income-producing activity - the prOVISIOn of Internet access service - IS
performed both inside and outside Idaho. Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 84, lines 20-23 ("We provide the
internet access services in 48 systems in 19 states, yes."); see also Tax Commission Br. at 4 ("In
2005, Cable One provided Internet access to customers in 19 states ... "); Joint Stip. of Exhibits
and Facts ,-r 9, R. 000280 (noting that the Network Operations Center and Solution Center
support the "provision ofInternet access service by all of Cable One's 48 cable systems located
in the 19 states in which Cable One is authorized to operate").
The District Court's focus on "attracting and servicing Idaho Internet access customers"
also conflicts with IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02, which instructs that "[t]he term income
producing activity applies to each separate item of income and means the transactions and
activity directly engaged in by the taxpayer in the regular course of its trade or business for the
ultimate purpose of obtaining gains or profit." It is the taxpayer that determines its "separate
item[ s] of income" based. on the taxpayer's specific "trade or business."

IDAP A Rule

35.01.01.550.02; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 212 Cal. App. 4th 78,95 (2012)

(holding that "California permits the taxpayer to rely on its own accounting methods in
determining its items of income"). In the regular course of its business, Cable One directly
engages in transactions and activity to provide cable television services, Internet access services,
advertising, and cable modem leasing for the ultimate purpose of obtaining gains or profit. Tr.
Feb. 25/26, p. 40, lines 2-9; see also I.C. § 63-3027(a)(1) (defining "business income" as
"income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of [Cable Oners trade or
business").

As the evidence in this case demonstrates, the regular course of Cable One's

-5-
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business does not include a separate income-producing activity of "attracting and servicing Idaho
Internet access customers." Conc. of Law 11, R. 000343; see also Joint Stip. of Exhibits and
Facts,-r 9, R. 000280 (noting Cable One's "provision of Internet access service by all of Cable
One's 48 cable systems located in the 19 states in which Cable One is authorized to operate").
Cable One applied the plain language of IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 to identify its
income-producing activity as the provision of Internet access service across 19 states. Cable One
Br. at 16. This is the same approach taken by Cable One with respect to each of its other
income-producing activities to which the Tax Commission has not objected. (Tr. Feb 25/26, p.
85, lines 1-20). The key to determining the income-producing activity is to look at the "overall"
activity engaged in by the taxpayer, which is consistent with the plain language of IDAP A Rule
35.01.01.550.02. The rule "addresses what income-producing activity gave rise to a receipt"
because the rule focuses on "transactions and activity having an ultimate purpose of obtaining
gain. The focus is obviously broader than the last acts taken to realize gain. . .. [G]ain was
produced by a combination of activities." Crystal Commc 'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, State, TC
4769,2010 WL 2827462, at *16 (Or. T.C. July 19,2010) (emphasis in original), affd sub nom.
Crystal Commc'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 353 Or. 300,297 P.3d 1256 (2013). The "overall"
activity at issue here is the operation of Cable One's integrated multistate cable television
broadband network from its headquarters in Arizona, which makes the provision of Internet
access service possible in Idaho and in every other state in which Cable One operates. Tr. Feb.
25126, p. 269, lines 13-24; cf Comm'r of Revenue v. AT&T Corp., 2012 WL 2865870, at *1-*2
(Mass. App. Ct. July 13, 2012) ("AT&T Massachusetts Appear') (finding that it was AT&T's

-6-
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"operation of its global network based in New Jersey that qualified as its income-producing
activity" because AT&T "could not have provided the long-distance telephone calls to its
customers without the integrated long-distance network based in New Jersey and other
locations"); Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury, 403 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (looking at "plaintiffs post-season revenues in 1976 through 1979, representing
consideration for its overall operation of an NFL club").
The District Court also concluded that "[ a] literal reading of the IDAP A Rule
35.01.01.550.02 definition of 'income producing activity' would require a transactional analysis
of the cost of performance for Cable One receiving each Idaho customer's monthly payment for
Internet access." (Conc. of Law 10, R. 000342).2 But the District Court found application of the
"transactional" approach to Cable One would be burdensome and inappropriate. (Conc. of Law
10, R. 000342). The Tax Commission similarly admits that using the "transactional" approach is
not appropriate "given the facts of this case," but nonetheless argues that it should be the rule of
law in Idaho for use in "a different factual circumstance." Tax Commission Br. at 12-13, nA.3 If

The concept of a "transactional" approach to defining Cable One's income-producing
activity was raised by the Tax Commission for the first time in response to Cable One's request
for review of the Notice of Deficiency Determination from which this appeal originates.
(R. 000251).

The Tax Commission and its witnesses abandoned their arguments in favor of a
"transactional" approach early on in this litigation. See, e.g., Starkey Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 36)

-7-
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the District Court's decision is permitted to stand, all multistate corporations with business
activity in Idaho will be forced to live with this erroneous interpretation ofIdaho law.
The Tax Commission's support of the "transactional" approach incorrectly applies the
plain language of IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 by focusing on only four words of the rule "separate item of income"

which the Tax Commission asserts is "each of the monthly

payments received from each of the Idaho Internet access customers in 2005." Tax Commission
Br. at 12. The Tax Commission cannot pick and choose pieces of the legal framework without
regard for the plain language of the statute or regulation as a whole. Clark v. Shari's Mgmt.
Corp., 155 Idaho 576, 314 P.3d 631,635 (2013) ("This Court is required to 'give effectto all the

words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. "')
(citation omitted). There is nothing in Idaho law that requires Cable One to identify its incomeproducing activity in the manner proposed by the Tax Commission.

at p. 38, line 19 through p. 39, line 23 ("I don't think [Cable One is] required to do it on a
customer-by-customer or a ... transaction-by-transaction basis"). The Tax Commission openly
acknowledged that a transactional approach based on each Idaho customer would result in
economic or administrative burdens. Fischer Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 33) at p. 33, lines 8-18
(opining that direct costs should be identified "in an economically feasible manner," meaning
"without an unreasonable amount of time" or "amount of expense associated with determining
that cost"); Starkey 2nd Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 37) at p. 14, line 21 through p. 15, line 20 (noting
that grouping transactions "may be administratively expedient").

-8-
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Cable One does not engage in "numerous income-producing activities ... to ensure that
each of [its] Idaho customers would make each of their monthly payments for Internet access
service throughout the 2005 taxable year." Tax Commission Br. at 13. Cable One engages in
business activities and transactions that enable it to provide the income-producing activity of
selling Internet access services "for the ultimate purpose of obtaining gains or profit." IDAPA
Rule 35.01.01.550.02. The "activities" listed by the Tax Commission (activities at Cable One's
Network Operations Center and Solution Center in Arizona, activities by Cable One employees
in Idaho, activities/transactions with Qwest and AT&T, and activities constructing Cable One's
network) are not the income-producing activity; they are inputs necessary to provide the incomeproducing activity. Crystal Commc'ns, 2010 WL 2827462, at *16. For example, Cable One
does not purchase Internet backbone services from Qwest and AT&T for the ultimate purpose of
obtaining gains or profit; those services are necessary for Cable One to provide Internet access
service to customers in all 48 systems in 19 states and are used to manage the cable television
broadband network. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 278, lines 19-23; Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 274, lines 4-9). This
is no different than Cable One's purchase of video programming in order to provide cable
television services. (Tr. Feb 25/26, p. 74, lines 2-15 (explaining that one of Cable One's direct
costs for cable television services is the purchase of programming such as ESPN)). Cable One's
provision of cable television services to customers is the "income-producing activity," not the
purchase of the programming needed to provide the cable television service.

The Tax

Commission's view of Cable One's income-producing activities does not comport with the plain
language ofIDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02.

-9-
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The Tax Commission's position also is inconsistent with the Tax Commission's
acceptance of how Cable One applies I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) and IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 for
each of its other income-producing activities.

The record demonstrates that Cable One

conducted the same type of cost of performance analysis for its cable television and advertising
services in 2005, both of which were performed inside and outside ofIdaho. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, pp.
84-86).4 The Tax Commission has not questioned Cable One's application of Idaho law in
relation to Cable One's sales of cable television service and advertising, or its leasing of cable
modems. (Tr. Feb 25126, p. 85, lines 1-20). How Cable One defines its income-producing
activity under I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) and IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 appears to be unacceptable
to the Tax Commission only when it results in the exclusion of revenue despite the fact that the
plain language of the statute contemplates such a result. I.C. § 63-3027(c), (r)(2).
The Tax Commission has recognized that the "income-producing activity test" found in
I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) "is one of the most troublesome aspects of the UDITPA statute" but while
the test "is by no means perfect, it remains the test set out in the Idaho statute." Protest of

[Redacted], Tax Commission Docket No. 17740, Decision at 3, 4 (Idaho State Tax Commission
2005). The Tax Commission "has the duty to enforce the tax laws of this state as written" and
"[u ]nless and until the Idaho Legislature implements a new test, taxpayers providing services

4

Cable One did not need to conduct a cost of performance analysis for its income-

producing activity of cable modem leasing because that activity was performed only in Idaho.
Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 86, lines 1-12; see also IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.05.b.
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within this state must comply with the current test."

Id.

The District Court erred in its

conclusion that identification of the income-producing activity under IDAPA Rule
35.01.01.550.02 requires "a transactional analysis," and the Tax Commission has provided no
support for that conclusion.
B.

Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Demonstrates Cable One Defined Its
Income-Producing Activity in the Manner Intended by the Idaho Statute and
the Tax Commission's Implementing Regulations

Case law from other states further supports Cable One's application of the plain language
ofI.C. § 63-3027(r) and IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 to define its income-producing activity as
the provision of Internet access service in 19 states. Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue,
148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008) ("When confronted with matters of first
impression involving Idaho statutes, this Court may glean insight from the interpretations of
sister states concerning similar or identical statutes."). Consistent with Cable One's approach
here, Massachusetts defines a taxpayer's income-producing activity based on the "overall
activity" or the "totality of activities" undertaken by the taxpayer. AT&T Corp. v. Comm'r of
Revenue, 2011 WL 2243933 at *2 (Mass. App. Tx. Bd. June 8, 2011) ("AT&T Massachusetts
Board Decision") (finding AT&T "engaged in numerous activities ... both within and without
Massachusetts that were necessary to the overall activity of operating and managing the
network"); Boston Prof Hockey Ass 'n v. Comm'r of Revenue, 2003 WL 21499974, at *11
(Mass. App. Tx. Bd. June 30, 2003) ("Boston Prof Hockey Board Decision") (finding it was
"the totality of activities" that "constituted activities whose performance created an obligation in
the ultimate customers to pay consideration"), ajJ'd by Boston Prof Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v.
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Comm'r of Revenue, 820 N.E.2d 792, 799 (Mass. 2005) (professional hockey team's incomeproducing activity was "many subsidiary activities (including the playing of games) necessary to
create a viable NHL franchise"). The "activity that gives rise to [the] sales income is [the
taxpayer's] overall operation of a business." Interface Group v. Comm'r of Revenue, 2008 WL
4642961, at *9 (Mass. App. Tx. Bd. Oct. 17,2008). Massachusetts specifically rejected the Tax
Commission's "transactional" approach by finding, for example in the AT&T Massachusetts
case, that "each long-distance call" did not constitute the income-producing activity because
"customers were actually paying for a reliable system of telecommunications, and that it was the
operation of [the] global network based in New Jersey that qualified as [the] income-producing
activity." AT&T Massachusetts Appeal at *1.
The Tax Commission tries to distinguish the Massachusetts line of cases by arguing that
the Massachusetts regulation defining "income-producing activity" has "significant differences"
from the Idaho definition, and that "appears" to have been the determining factor for the
Massachusetts courts' findings.

Tax Commission Br. at 15. 5 There is no merit to the Tax

The Tax Commission claims Cable One advocated in its brief for an "operational"
approach for identifying the income-producing activity (Tax Commission Br. at 12), but there is
no discussion of "operational" in Cable One's Opening Brief. Rather, Cable One asserted that
the income-producing activity at issue in this case is the provision of Internet access services in
19 states, which is consistent with Cable One's own accounting practices, Idaho law, and the law
of other states. Cable One Br. at 15-16.
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Commission's claim. The Massachusetts regulation uses the phrase "transaction, procedure, or
operation" while the Idaho regulation uses "transactions and activity." Compare 830 Mass.
Code Regs. 63.38.1 with IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02. With the inclusion of "activity" and
"operation," both regulations use language to suggest that a taxpayer look beyond a single event
or transaction to the taxpayer's total activities or operations. "Activity" and "operation" have
similar meanings, the Massachusetts courts use the terms interchangeably, and there is nothing to
suggest the Massachusetts regulation means something fundamentally different because it uses
the word "operation" rather than "activity."

AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *10

(looking at "overall activity" to find "AT&T's income-producing activity was its operation of its
global network"); Boston Prof Hockey Board Decision at *5, *11 (looking at "the totality of
activities" to determine the "income-producing activity was the ownership and operation of an
NHL franchise").
The Massachusetts line of cases is consistent with several similar cases from Michigan,
which the Tax Commission neglects to address at all. See, e.g., Detroit Lions, Inc., 403 N.W.2d
at 820-21 ("In defining the term 'business activity,' M.C.L. § 208.3(2) refers specifically to the
activity of the taxpayer, and thus we agree that the proper focus is not on whether the Lions
themselves played in post-season games, but on the activity which gave rise to their entitlement
to post-season revenue. This revenue was earned through the plaintiffs membership in the NFL
and its performance of duties which arise from that membership, such as taking part in football
games, both home and away.") (emphasis in original); Michiana Metronet, Inc. v. Michigan

Dep't of Treasury, 2011 WL 3890444, at *5 (Mich. Tax Trib. Aug. 11,2011) (fmding that the
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"business activity" at issue is "providing an integrated wireless communications network that
allows for the routing and completion of wireless communication transmissions including voice
calls, text messages, data, and other associated services") ("Michiana Tribunal Decision"), aird
by Michiana Metronet, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury, 2012 WL 5854453, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.
8, 2012). The cost of performance statute in Michigan uses the term "business activity" instead
of "income-producing activity," and defmes "business activity" based on the "activity of the
taxpayer" similar to the Idaho regulation. Compare Mich. Compo Laws § 208.3(2) (defming
"business activity") with IDAP A 35.01.01.550.02.

The Michigan decisions view income-

producing activity in the same way as the Massachusetts courts despite the fact that the Michigan
definition of "business activity" contains no reference to the word "operation.,,6 These cases

6

"Business activity" is defined as: "a transfer of legal or equitable title to or rental of

property, whether real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or the performance of services,
or a combination thereof, made or engaged in, or caused to be made or engaged in, within this
state, whether in intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce, with the object of gain, benefit, or
advantage, whether direct or indirect, to the taxpayer or to others, but shall not include the
services rendered by an employee to his employer, services as a director of a corporation, or a
casual transaction. Although an activity of a taxpayer may be incidental to another or other of
his business activities, each activity shall be considered to be business engaged in within the
meaning of this act." Mich. Compo Laws § 208.3(2).
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provide further support for defining Cable One's income-producing activity as the provision of
Internet access service in 19 states.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION FAILED TO PROPERLY ANALYZE
CABLE ONE'S DIRECT COSTS OF PROVIDING INTERNET ACCESS
SERVICE
Once the income-producing activity is defined, both parties agree that the second step in

an analysis under I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) is to "[i]dentify the direct costs of performing the incomeproducing activity." Tax Commission Br. at 11; see also Cable One Br. at 13 (stating the second
step is "identification of the costs of performance of that income-producing activity using a
direct costs analysis"). As the Tax Commission previously has observed, "[u]nder Idaho law, the
focus of the 'income-producing activity' inquiry is on the direct costs associated with the
generation of the income in the taxpayer's regular course of business. Indirect costs relating to
the generation of the income, such as compensation paid to officers and directors and other
general and administrative costs, are not considered." Protest of [Redacted], Tax Commission
Docket No. 17740, Decision at 5 (Idaho State Tax Commission 2005). The issue of "what are
the direct costs" was a key "factual question" before the Court in this case. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p.
52, lines 18-22).
Cable One looked to its profit and loss statements to determine the direct costs for
producing its Internet access service income. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 88, lines 19-23). IDAP A Rule
35.01.01.550.03 states that direct costs are to be determined "according to generally accepted
accounting principles and accepted conditions or practices of the taxpayer's trade or business."
Consistent with the requirements of the rule, Cable One's profit and loss statements were
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prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles and also were "prepared
according to the accepted conditions or practices of Cable One's business." (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p.
44, lines 2-23). Cable One's profit and loss statements provide an "objective standard or set of
standards for determining direct costs" as they are generated as part of "a financial accounting or
externally focused process" and thus can be viewed as "a generally accepted accounting
principle or industry wide practice." AT&T Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2012 WL 119850, at *6
(Or.

T.e. Jan. 12,2012) ("AT&T Oregon"); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 212

Cal. App. 4th 78, 95 (20 12) (citing to California's "costs of performance" definition in rmding
that "California permits the taxpayer to rely on its own accounting methods in determining its
items of income"). 7

7

The Tax Commission takes issue with Cable One's reliance on the Microsoft case for the

proposition that a taxpayer may rely on its own accounting methods in determining its direct
costs. Tax Commission Br. at 20-21. Cable One understands that identifying "items of income"
(i.e., income-producing activities) is a separate step from identifying "costs of performance" (i.e.,

direct costs). See, e.g., Cable One Br. at 13. While the Microsoft court may have referenced
"items of income," its intent is clear as reflected by its citation to the California rule defining
"costs of performance."

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, § 25136(c) (2005) ("The term 'costs of

performance' means direct costs determined in a manner consistent with generally accepted
accounting principles and in accordance with accepted conditions or practices in the trade or
business of the taxpayer."). California's definition of "costs of performance" is nearly identical
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IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.03 requITes that only "direct costs" be considered when
determining costs of performance. The District Court failed to engage in any legal or factual
analysis to distinguish between direct and indirect costs associated with Cable One's Internet
access service. The District Court was not excused from conducting this analysis because the
parties stipulated to certain of Cable One's direct costs associated with its Internet access service.

Cj Tax Commission Br. at 19. The District Court was required to determine whether the costs
were direct or indirect for any Cable One costs that were not stipulated to by the parties before
including such costs in the costs of performance of Cable One's Internet access service. Cable
One Br. at 20-21; see also IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.03.
Instead, without substantial and competent evidence, the District Court found that "direct
costs include the costs incurred by Cable One in providing internet services to its Idaho
customers." (Conc. of Law 9, R. 000342). This conclusion ignores the law requiring costs of
performance to focus on direct costs only and is tantamount to interpreting "direct costs" to
"swallow so many costs that 'direct costs' becomes virtually synonymous with 'all costs. '"
AT&T Oregon at *6; see also IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.03 ("Costs of performance are the
direct costs .... "). Direct costs cannot mean the same as the costs "incurred to engage in the
general business activity." AT&T Oregon at *6; see also Illuminating Co. v. Burns, 2014 WL
585254, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13,2014) (finding that direct costs for purposes of calculating
damages "are the expenses incurred as a result of the actual project and include materials, labor,

to the one contained in Idaho's regUlations. IDAPA 35.01.01.550.03.
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mileage, and equipment costs" while indirect costs "are the expenses involved in running a
business and are not attributable to anyone project") (citations omitted).
The District Court's error was compounded further by its conclusion that "[a]llocated
capitol [sic] improvement costs" should be included as a direct cost in Cable One's cost of
performance analysis. (Conc. of Law 13, R. 000343). There is no legal or factual support for
including capital costs or depreciation associated with Cable One's cable television broadband
network as "direct costs" of providing Internet access service. 8 None of those costs were
incurred specifically to provide Internet access service, and Cable One would have incurred
those costs if Cable One did not offer Internet access service. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 200, lines 1723; Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 201, lines 11-19). Cable One excluded capital costs and depreciation from
its cost of performance analysis because those costs were not incurred only "because the revenue
producing transaction or activity in question occurred." AT&T Oregon at *5; see also Feb.

25/26, p. 108, lines 21-25, p. 109, lines 1-25.

Based on "generally accepted accounting

principles and accepted conditions or practices" of Cable One's business and as directed by the
applicable IDAPA rule, Cable One excluded capital costs and depreciation associated with its

The District Court's decision to utilize Cable One's 2005 qualified Broadband Tax Credit
as a proxy for capitalized costs and depreciation also is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence, and is unprecedented. (Conc. of Law 12, R. 000343). Idaho's Broadband
Tax Credit regime is irrelevant to the questions posed here. I.C. § 63-30291; see also Cable One
Br. at 22-23.
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cable television broadband network from its costs of performance of its Internet access service
because they are not "direct costs" of that service. The District Court's conclusion is contrary to
law and the record evidence, and if upheld, would affect all multistate corporations operating in
Idaho.
The Tax Commission recognizes the inclusion or exclusion of capital costs and
depreciation as direct costs is "inconsequential" to Cable One's cost of performance analysis, but
nonetheless argues for their inclusion. Tax Commission Br. at 19. The Tax Commission offers
no legal or factual basis for treating capital costs or depreciation as direct costs.

The Tax

Commission's own witness explained that costs relating to equipment and facilities not
specifically installed and utilized exclusively for Internet access service do not constitute direct
costs. See, e.g., Fischer Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 33) at p.42, line 10 through p. 43, line 24. The
Tax Commission also agreed that depreciation is not always considered a direct cost, and that
Cable One would still incur depreciation even if Cable One did not offer Internet access service.
See, e.g., Fischer Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 33) at p. 52, lines 18-25; p. 53, lines 1-16; Starkey 2nd
Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 37) at p. 66, line 22 through p. 68, line 21. Tax Commission witness
Starkey took this same position in the AT&T Oregon case. See, e.g., AT&T Oregon at *5
(adopting the testimony of the expert witnesses in the case, including Tax Commission witness
Starkey, "that direct costs are those that are only incurred because the revenue producing
transaction or activity in question occurred"). There is no basis for including capital costs or
depreciation as direct costs because the substantial evidence in this case demonstrates that the
"assets in place and the depreciation on those would be incurred regardless of whether" the
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income-producing activity (Internet access service) was offered to customers or not. AT&T
Oregon at n.7; Hannan Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 26) at p. 18, lines 5-23, p. 21, line 19 through p.
22, line 24; see also Starkey 2nd Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 37) at p. 60, lines 10-18.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE LOCATION
OF CABLE ONE'S DIRECT COSTS
A.

The Internet Backbone Services Are Arizona Costs Based on the Totality of
Cable One's Activities to Provide Internet Access Service in 19 States

The Qwest and AT&T Internet backbone service costs are properly sourced to Arizona
because they are costs associated with the operation of Cable One's entire cable television
broadband network, which is centrally managed from Arizona. Cf AT&T Massachusetts Board
Decision at *10 ("Simply put, AT&T could not provide its long-distance service without
operating its entire long-distance network."). Cable One realizes income from its provision of
Internet access service only by virtue of its cable systems' connection to Arizona and Cable
One's cable television broadband network as a whole.

Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 269, lines 13-24

(explaining how Cable One could not offer service without a connection to Arizona); see also
Detroit Lions, 403 N.W.2d at 820-21 (finding football team earned revenue "through the
plaintiff s membership in the NFL and its performance of duties which arise from that
membership," and thus costs were measured not on the basis of each game, but on plaintiffs
overall operation as an NFL club). This is similar to the Michiana case, in which a wireless
carrier had "network assets" in both Indiana and Michigan, and those network assets were
necessary for the carrier to provide service. Applying costs of performance, the majority of the
carrier's costs were determined to be in Indiana because it was where "the infrastructure that
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provided services such as internet access, e-mail delivery, billing, text messaging, and other
services" was located. Michiana Tribunal Decision at *4. In reviewing the taxpayer's costs of
performance determination, the Michigan courts looked at the entire "integrated wireless
communication network" used by the carrier because the "entire wireless network, located in
both Indiana and Michigan, was necessary for Petitioner to provide its services." Michiana
Tribunal Decision at *5. Cable One cannot provide Internet access service in any location
without access to its infrastructure in Arizona, which includes its Solution Center, Network
Operations Center, provisioning module, LDAP module, SNMP module, DHCP module, TFTP
module, DNS Module, billing module, and customer email module. (Findings of Fact 15, R.
000336-38; see also Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 266 line 23 through p. 267, line 6). Cable One connects
its entire cable television broadband network to Arizona using the Qwest and AT&T backbone
services; the backbone services are a necessary component of the overall operation that is needed
to provide Internet access service. General Mills, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 795 N.E.2d 552,
570 (Mass. 2003) (finding "that it was the business operations (including billing and customer
relations) and management ofTalbots" that was the income-producing activity).
Cable One's Arizona headquarters are essential to its Internet access service and cannot
be ignored. Cf AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *11 ("Just as it has recognized the
importance of a taxpayer's Massachusetts headquarters, the Board here must equally recognize
the importance of AT&T's centralized network hub, which was located outside of
Massachusetts."); see also AT&T Massachusetts Appeal at *2 (stressing "the importance of the
activities that took place at the headquarters of the company"). The District Court recognized
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that "the personnel, staff, servers, equipment and software that support the operations of [Cable
One's] cable systems" were "[l]ocated at Cable One's Phoenix, Arizona headquarters," and that
those Arizona operations "support the internet services provided by Cable One through its 48
cable systems." (Finding of Fact 6, R. 000333). Similarly, Cable One employees located in
Arizona negotiate, centrally manage, and oversee the purchase, implementation, billing, and
payment relating to the backbone services contracts. See, e.g., Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 270, lines 3-16;
p. 273, lines 16-23; p. 281, lines 4-13; p. 280, lines 4-13; p. 282, lines 9-11; see also Aff. of
Bradley D. Ottley ~~ 13-15, R. 000163-64. 9 The importance of the activities taking place at
Cable One's Arizona headquarters to the overall operation of Cable One's cable television
broadband network and its Internet access service cannot be overlooked. Boston Prof Hockey
Board Decision at *3 (fmding activities performed in Massachusetts because general manager
maintained an office in Massachusetts and "negotiated contracts" from that office); Boston Prof
Hockey, 820 N.E.2d at 799, 800-01 (affirming importance of where "activities" took place,
including where the NHL franchise was "administered and managed"); AT&T Massachusetts
Board Decision at *11 ("[W]hile AT&T engaged in numerous subsidiary activities, both within
and outside Massachusetts, that were an essential part of its income-producing activity, it
provided ample evidence establishing the importance of the activities performed at its Global
Network Operations Center, where employees operated and managed a network capable of
routing and re-routing each transmission in order to ensure its successful completion."). There is
no Internet access service (income-producing activity) to Cable One customers anywhere
9

Mr. Ottley's Affidavit was also used as Trial Exhibit 31.
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without the connection between the cable systems in the 19 states and the Cable One Arizona
headquarters. This connection is only possible by virtue of Cable One's agreements with Qwest
and AT&T for interstate communications services.

B.

The Internet Backbone Services Are Arizona Costs Based on Record
Evidence and Legal Precedent

The District Court's decision that the costs related to the Internet backbone services
Cable One purchases from Qwest and AT&T were incurred by Cable One in Idaho is contrary to
substantial and competent record evidence and well-established law. (Findings of Fact 14(f), 25,
R. 000336, 339). The importance of the Internet backbone services to Cable One's overall

operation of its cable television broadband network from its Arizona headquarters is not at issue.
(Findings of Fact 6, 15, R. 000333, 336 (listing the "Internet Backbone" as part of "Cable One's
Arizona Back Office" and explaining "Located at Cable One's Phoenix, Arizona headquarters
are the personnel, staff, servers, equipment and software that support the operations of its 48
cable systems. Within the headquarters is the' Arizona back office' that consists of the Solution
Center and Network Operations Center personnel, the router, servers and related equipment and
software that support the internet services provided by Cable One through its 48 cable
systems")). Yet both the District Court and the Tax Commission erroneously characterize the
costs of the Internet backbone services as "Idaho" costs rather than costs incurred by Cable One
in Arizona. There is no support for this position. The evidence of this case and applicable law
demonstrate that Cable One properly categorized its Internet backbone costs for the Qwest and
AT&T services as costs incurred in Arizona.
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First, the services provided by Qwest and AT&T do not "involve two distinct services."
(Finding of Fact 14{f), R. 000336; Tax Commission Br. at 25-26). The contracts for services do
not permit Cable One to purchase a "local service connection" from Qwest or AT&T as a
separate service as Cable One's witness explained: "It clearly states on page one of the contract,
local access may only be purchased if also purchasing at least one of the following: Voice and
data, DIA, dedicated internet access, dedicated IP transit and/or private routed network services.

In our case DIA." (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 274, lines 4-9; p. 277, lines 22-25; p. 276, lines 1-6). All
of those services are interstate long distance services. {Tr. Feb 27, p. 57, line 22 through p. 58,
line 12 ("What it does tell me is that the FCC considers this service to be an interstate service.
There is no way around that. And it does that because there is this whole other body of law of
the FCC about Internet service and high-speed data service services. . . . the FCC . . . took
primary jurisdiction of traffic that travels to the Internet under the notion that you can't tell
where it's going to go, whether it's going to cross state boundaries or anything else.")). Both
carrier contracts state that the local access service may only be purchased in connection with the
customer's use of the carrier's long distance network services or IP services for which a local
connection is required. See, e.g., Qwest Agreement, Local Access Service Exhibit (Trial Exhibit
28) at 10 (section 4.1) ("Customer may purchase the Service only in connection with Customer's
use of Qwest Interexchange carrier services or IP services on the Qwest Domestic Network for
which a local loop is required."); Qwest Agreement (Trial Exhibit 28) at 1,2 {stating the services
are available in all states in which Qwest operates and noting that local access service may be
purchased only if Cable One also purchases at least one other interstate service, which includes
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dedicated Internet access service); AT&T Agreement, Global Addendum to Master Agreement
(Trial Exhibit 29) (stating that services are to be delivered in the United States); AT&T
Agreement, AT&T Managed Internet Service Addendum (Trial Exhibit 29) at 1, ,-r 5 (stating that
the prices are "solely for Internet port bandwidth" and do not include local access charges that
may be associated with the service). The Qwest and AT&T agreements provide an interstate
communication service made available by combining several Qwest and AT&T products,
including a local access element. The local access element is a small part of the overall long
distance service ultimately sold to Cable One, which allows Cable One to connect its cable
systems in 19 states to its Arizona headquarters and the Arizona headquarters to connect the
customers of those 48 cable systems to the Internet. Aff. of Bradley D. Ottley,-r 10, R. 000162;
see also Nat 'I Cable & Telecomms. Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 990 (2005)
("It is common usage to describe what a company 'offers' to a consumer as what the consumer

perceives to be the integrated finished product, even to the exclusion of discrete components that
compose the product.").
Second, Qwest and AT&T are not providing Cable One with "a dedicated high-speed
network connection to the Internet." Tax Commission Br. at 26. Cable One is "purchasing
backbone services to obtain bandwidth to be able to communicate in Idaho with the router that's
in Idaho across the Qwest or AT&T network to the route[r] in Cable One in Phoenix." (Tr. Feb.

25126, p. 304, lines 18-22). Each of the headends in Cable One's cable television broadband
network has one or more dedicated Internet access ports (with different bandwidth levels
depending on the port), and each of those ports connects to similar dedicated Internet access
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ports at Cable One's Arizona headquarters. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 324, lines 2-25; p. 325, lines 116). The Qwest and AT&T services are end-to-end services. Cable One has "created a tunnel or

a virtual private line between the [Cable One] router in Idaho to Cable One Phoenix" and uses
"the Qwest or AT&T network to facilitate that transmission from the Idaho router to the Cable
One Phoenix router." (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 310, lines 17-25). The service provided by Qwest and
AT&T is a "dedicated" service, which is a point-to-point service in which Cable One detennines
the end points as Tax Commission witness Starkey admitted: "Mr. Ottley [Cable One's witness]
described it correctly as a tunnel. .. Cable One would set that up between its two routers, this
router at the headend, and then its router in Arizona and use its management system to define
that virtual private network between those two facilities." (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 99, lines 1-2, 17-21).
The Tax Commission's witness specifically rejected the notion that the traffic is ')ust being
thrown out on the Internet [to] let it find its way any way it wants to get there" based on the
understanding that Cable One was "defm[ing] a certain route, if you will, a logical route, that the
traffic will take between two points." (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 99, lines 3-5, 13-15). The routing, as
defined by Cable One using the Internet backbone services, ensures a repeated and continuous
interface with Cable One's Arizona headquarters in order for Cable One's customers to use the
Internet access service. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 266, line 23 through p. 267, line 6).
Third, Qwest and AT&T do not provide services to Cable One by "physically providing
and maintaining in Idaho the 'Idaho backbone services' for each Idaho cable system" or to Cable
One "at Cable One's Idaho headend facilities."

(Finding of Fact 25, R. 000339; Tax

Commission Br. at 27). The backbone services purchased from QwestlAT&T would be useless
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if those services were not connected to Cable One's Arizona headquarters. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p.
278, lines 3-14). A service always has both an origination and tennination point. This concept is
reflected on a typical phone bill, which provides the charges for the entire end-to-end phone call
(Boise to San Francisco), and the originating and terminating points of the call. The charge to
the customer for a call is based on the complete end-to-end service, not one charge for the Idaho
end of the call and a separate charge for the San Francisco end of the call. Cable One's purchase
of backbone services from Qwest and AT&T works in the same way. The Tax Commission's
focus on only the Idaho portion of the backbone services (Tax Commission Br. at 26-27) ignores
the reality of the backbone service being purchased by Cable One - an end-to-end service
between each of Cable One's 48 headends and Cable One's Arizona headquarters. Teleconnect
Co. v. The Bell Tel. Co. of Penn., et al., 10 F.C.C.R. 1626,,-r 12 (1995) (focusing on "the end-toend nature" of a service or "the nature of the communications" rather than "the facilities used to
complete such communications") (citing Nat 'I Ass 'n of Regulatory Uti!. Comm'rs v. FCC, 746
F.2d 1492, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (subsequent history omitted).
Fourth, the facilities used and the path chosen by Qwest and AT&T does not change the
fact that Cable One purchases and utilizes the Internet backbone services for all of its 48 cable
systems throughout 19 states.

Cf Tax Commission Br. at 23-24; see also GTE Telephone

Operating Cos. GTOC Tariff No. 1 GTOC Transmittal No. 1148, 13 F.C.C.R. 22466,,-r 19 (1998)
(finding the "fact that the facilities and apparatus used for [a] service offering may be located
within a single state does not affect [the] jurisdiction" of the service), recon. denied, 17 F.C.C.R.
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27409 (1999).10 The record evidence demonstrates that the Qwest and AT&T contracts cover the
provision of services to all Cable One systems in its multistate service territory under a single
contract with each carrier. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 274, lines 4-9; p. 277, lines 22-25; p. 278, lines 16). The contracts are multiyear agreements with discounts, revenue commitments, and shortfall
liabilities applied based on Cable One's total purchase of services for connection with all Cable
One systems under a single carrier agreement. (Tr. Feb 25/26, pp. 275-76). The contracts are
negotiated, managed, and services are paid for by the Arizona headquarters. See, e.g., Tr. Feb.
25126, p. 270, lines 3-16; p. 273, lines 16-23; p. 281, lines 4-13; p. 282, lines 9-11; see also Aff.

of Bradley D. Ottley,-r,-r 13-15, R. 000163-64. There is no question that activities occurring at
Cable One's Arizona headquarters, including the purchase of the Internet backbone services,
"support the internet services provided by Cable One through its 48 cable systems." (Finding of
Fact 6, R. 000333).
Finally, the Qwest and AT&T services cannot be divorced from their legal and regulatory
treatment. The Internet backbone services provided by Qwest and AT&T are interstate services.
Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 274, lines 10-20 (explaining that the backbone services traverse state lines as

10

This is because "the path taken by the electronic signals is often indirect and typically

bears no relation to state boundaries. The number of possible paths, the nature of the electronic
signals, and the system of computerized switching make it virtually impossible to trace and
record the actual paths taken by the electronic signals." Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 255
(1989).
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they pennit "communication from the router in Idaho to the router in Phoenix by way of the
Qwest or AT&T network"); see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(28) (defining "interstate communication"
or "interstate transmission"); 47 C.F.R. § 36.154(a) (stating that if greater than 10% of the traffic
across a circuit is interstate, all of the traffic is classified as interstate). Qwest and AT&T
consider the backbone services Cable One purchases to be interstate services.

See Aff. of

Bradley D. Ottley ~ 17, R. 000165; see also Qwest Agreement (Trial Exhibit 28) at 10 (requiring
Qwest's service to be used for interstate purposes). Even the Tax Commission admits that the
backbone services are interstate services. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 57, lines 22-24). The Idaho portion of
the backbone services is only "an intrastate strand of an interstate service." In re Frontline

Communications Corp., 2006 WL 776281, at *10 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Mar. 16,2006). While
there may be intrastate components as part of an overall interstate service offered by an entity,
that service should be characterized "by reference to the nature of the data traffic carried over the
provided lines and the destination of those communications." In re Fastnet Corporation, 2006
WL 776280, at *13 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Mar. 16, 2006); see also Nat 'I Ass'n of Regulatory

Uti!. Comm'rs, 746 F.2d at 1498 (finding the jurisdiction of a service "depends on 'the nature of
the communications which pass through the facilities [and not on] the physical location of the
lines''') (quoting California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84,86 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Focusing on the physical
location of equipment owned by another company from which Cable One purchases services
"ignore[s] altogether the actual uses" of the Internet backbone services. Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel.

Co., 282 U.S. 133, 150-51 (1930); see also Moran Towing and Transp. Co. v. New York State
Tax Comm'n, 72 N.Y.2d 166,171 (1988) ("The focus is on what the actor does, not where he
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does it.").
To source the costs relating to the Internet backbone services to Idaho because Qwest and
AT&T utilize facilities that may have physical intermediate points in Idaho ignores the reality of
the services purchased by Cable One and the purpose for which they are purchased. The
backbone services are used to connect each of Cable One's 48 cable systems to Arizona and to
each other, are an integral component to Cable One's provision of services to customers
(including Internet access service), are purchased pursuant to a single contract with each carrier
that covers all of the states in which Cable One operates, and are negotiated and managed from
Arizona. The backbone services are a necessary component of Cable One's overall operation of
its nationwide cable television broadband network, which is centrally managed from Arizona.
The costs associated with the Internet backbone services should be treated as Arizona costs based
on the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *11;

AT&T Massachusetts Appeal at *1-*2; Detroit Lions, 403 N.W.2d at 820-21; Michiana Tribunal
Decision at *4-*5.
IV.

FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION AND
APPORTIONMENT ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
A.

The District Court Erred in Its Reliance on the "Fairly Represents"
Standard to Review Cable One's Compliance with the Standard Allocation
and Apportionment under § 63-3027(r)

The District Court correctly concluded that this case involves "calculation of the sales
factor" under I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) and the Commission's implementing rules, and thus it would
be ''unnecessary and improper" to make any findings regarding "an alternate allocation and
apportionment under I.C. § 63-3027(s)." (Cone. of Law 5, 6, 21, R. 000342, 345). The District
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Court's conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's determination that there is "a very
strong presumption in favor of the normal three-factor apportionment and against the
applicability of' alternative allocation and apportionment. Union Pacific Corp. v. Idaho State

Tax Comm 'n, 139 Idaho 572, 576, 83 P.3d 116, 120 (2004); see also Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (finding the statutory three-factor formula "has
become ... something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas are judged").
The District Court, however, is not permitted to make determinations regarding Cable
One's compliance with

I.e.

§ 63-3027(r)(2) based on "fairness." Section 63-3027(r)(2) makes

no reference to what might "fairly represent" the extent of a taxpayer's business in Idaho, and
courts must implement the law as written. See, e.g., Idaho State Tax Comm 'n v. Haener Bros.,
121 Idaho 741, 743,828 P.2d 304,306 (1992); Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation,

State Tax Comm 'n, 107 Idaho 854, 856,693 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1984); see also Hayden Lake Fire
Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005) ("Where a statute is
unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and courts are free to apply the plain
meaning.").
Despite this, the District Court determined that excluding Cable One's Internet access
service revenues from the calculation of its Idaho sales factor did "not fairly represent the extent
of Cable One's 2005 business activity in Idaho." (Cone. of Law 19, R. 000344).1l The normal

II

Section 63-3027(s) does establish a "fairly represents" standard for reviewing whether

alternative allocation and apportionment may be applied when the standard allocation and
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three-factor apportionment standard under I.C. § 63-3027(r) for reporting multi state corporation
income does not hinge on whether the exclusion or inclusion of the revenue will produce a result
that "fairly represents" the taxpayer's business activity in the state. The sole consideration for
determining inclusion or exclusion of revenue under I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) is whether "a greater
proportion of the income-producing activity is performed in [Idaho] than in any other state,
based on costs of performance." I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2). The Tax Commission itself admits that
the "fairly represents" standard is found only in I.C. § 63-3027(s) governing alternative
allocation and apportionment. Tax Commission Br. at 29. The District Court's reliance on the
"fairly represents" standard to conclude that Cable One improperly excluded its Internet access
service sales is contrary to the plain language of the statute and constitutes an error of law. I.C. §
63-3027(r)(2); see also Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 124 Idaho 1, 5, 855
P.2d 462,466 (1993) ("Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of the literal
words of the statute."); Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 576, 83 P.3d at 120 ("There is a very strong
presumption in favor of the normal three-factor apportionment and against the applicability of
the relief provisions.").

apportionment provisions of I.C. § 63-3027(r) do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's
business in this state. See generally Union Pacific.

The District Court, however, correctly

concluded that alternative allocation under I.e. § 63-3027(s) would be improper in this case.
(Conc. of Law 19, R. 000344). Thus, the "fairly represents" standard has no application.
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B.

The Tax Commission Has Not Met Its Burden to Apply Alternative
Allocation and Apportionment to Cable One

The Tax Commission completely fails to address the very strong presumption in favor of
the use of the standard allocation and apportionment formula and against alternative allocation
and apportionment. The Tax Commission's brief is replete with references to the ***START
CONFIDENTIAL*** _

***END CONFIDENTIAL*** of sales revenue at issue in

this case as evidence that an alternative allocation and apportionment should be applied to Cable
One. See, e.g., Tax Commission Br. at 29, 30, 31, 35, 37. The amount of sales Cable One
generates is not a permissible reason to deviate from the strong presumption in favor of the
standard three-factor apportionment formula. Any consideration of alternative allocation and
apportionment must be based on Cable One's overall allocation and apportionment because
"[d]istortion in one factor. . . does not necessarily result in unfair reflection of the business
activity in the state." Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 577, 83 P.3d at 121 ("It is necessary to
establish that the application of the three factors does not fairly represent business activity, not
merely that one factor fails to meet this standard.") (emphasis added); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 700 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Or. 1985) (the "department must show not
just that one factor fails to meet this standard, but the entire formula taken together does not
fairly reflect taxpayer's business activity").
This fundamental flaw in the Tax Commission's analysis cannot be understated. Under
the Supreme Court's controlling Union Pacific precedent, the Tax Commission "must show that
the three-part formula does not accurately reflect the taxpayer's business in the State." Union
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Pacific, 139 Idaho at 575, 83 P.3d at 119; see also Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P.2d at 1042
("department must demonstrate that the statutory formula as a whole does not 'fairly represent
the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state"') (internal quotations omitted).
"Merely because the use of an alternative form of computation produces a higher business
activity attributable to [the state], is not in and of itself a sufficient reason from deviating from
the formula." Washington Federal, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 2008 WL 4600356 (Idaho
Dist. July 28, 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also US Bancorp v.
Dep't o/Revenue, 19 Or. Tax 266,310-11 (Or. T.C. 2007) (dismissing Department of Revenue's
claim that it may "require an adjustment whenever it decides that the adjustment would render
the taxpayer's return more fair and accurate" as "completely unsupported" since "[c]ourts have
long recognized that apportionment is not an exact science; kicking the ball through the uprights
is all that is needed, not a shot through a bulls-eye"). The Tax Commission must "establish[]
that statutory apportionment does not adequately reflect business activity, not merely that it does
not adequately reflect income earned in the state." Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 577,83 P.3d 121
(emphasis added); see also Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P.2d at 1042 (sarne).12

12

Cable One's 2005 income tax return is not "an inaccurate reflection" of Cable One's sales

in Idaho because Cable One failed to apply costs of performance in the years between 2001 and
2004. Cf Tax Commission Br. at 36 (citing Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 578, 83 P.3d at 122).
Determining the proper tax treatment of Cable One's sales under Idaho law for tax year 2005,
including the applicability of alternative apportionment, does not depend on Cable One's
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The Tax Commission has made no such showing here. The Tax Commission fails to
mention the ***START CONFIDENTIAL*** _

***END CONFIDENTIAL***

in sales revenue that was included in Cable One's sales factor numerator (and is not at issue
here),13 or the existence of the undisputed payroll and property factors. (Joint Stip. of Exhibits
and Facts

~

17, R. 000282). When viewed in totality as required under Union Pacific, over

***START CONFIDENTIAL***. ***END CONFIDENTIAL*** of Cable One's 2005
total income tax obligation to the State of Idaho is undisputed by the parties.

The Tax

Commission's focus on such a small portion of Cable One's overall income tax liability does not
begin to justify application of an alternative allocation and apportionment method here. Union
Pacific, 139 Idaho at 578, 83 P.3d at 122 ("What must be shown is sufficient distortion that
[taxpayer's] business activity in the state is not fairly reflected; simply advocating a better
method than the standard formula is unavailing") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Exclusion of Cable One's Internet access service revenue in the Idaho sales factor numerator
does not create a "sufficient distortion" from Cable One's tax return as filed to warrant deviation
from the "very strong presumption in favor of the normal three-factor apportionment." Union
Pacific, 139 Idaho at 576,83 P.3d at 120; see also Container Corp of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
historical income tax practices. Cable One Br. at n.7.
13

Cable One included the revenues from its cable television services, advertising services,

and cable modem leasing in the Idaho sales factor numerator of its Idaho income tax return for
2005. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 84, line 24 through p. 86, line 12).
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463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983) (fmding a difference of 14% between the standard statutory fonnula
and the alternative method did not provide sufficient distortion to pose a constitutional problem);

AT&T Teleholdings, Inc. v. Dep 't of Revenue, 978 N.E.2d 371, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (rejecting
alternative apportionment where difference in percentages was 26%); BellSouth Adver. & Pub.

Corp. v. Chumley, 308 S.W.3d 350, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding alternative
apportionment where the distortion was close to 97%); Tesoro Corp. v. State of Alaska Dept. of

Revenue, 312 P.3d 830, 847 (Alaska 2013) ("As we have stated in the past, [i]nherent in the use
of fonnula apportionment is the legislative decision that a certain degree of distortion will be
tolerated.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Tax Commission tries to support its alternative allocation and apportionment request
by proffering testimony from its expert witness Mr. Peters regarding the "desire" for the sales
factor to "represent the market state."

Tax Commission Br. at 34.14

Mr. Peters' opinion,

however, is the exact type of analysis discredited by Union Pacific because it is focused solely

14

Mr. Peters was retained as a witness only to address whether "the allocation and

apportionment provisions of section 63-3027, Idaho Code, as construed and applied by Cable
One, fairly represents the extent of its business activity in Idaho and whether Cable One has
correctly defmed the relevant Income producing activity." Peters Expert Report (Trial Exhibit
39) at p. 1. Yet as Mr. Peters admitted, he did not undertake any analysis of Cable One's
revenues and expenses or its profit and loss statements or its depreciation schedules before
forming his opinions. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 128, lines 16-21).
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on Cable One's income earned in the state. Tr. Feb. 27, p. 129, lines 9-18; Peters Expert Report
(Trial Exhibit 39) at 5; Tr. Feb. 27, p. 123, 1-10 (stating that Mr. Peters solely considered the
income earned by Cable One in the Idaho "market"); see also Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 577,
83 P.3d at 121 ("It must also be established that statutory apportionment does not adequately
reflect business activity, not merely that it does not adequately reflect income earned in the
state.").
The crux of Mr. Peters' opinion is that the law is flawed. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 132, lines 1324). When asked whether he was "opining on whether Cable One has interpreted the Idaho State
tax statute correctly," Mr. Peters conceded "I am not. They may be doing it correctly, they may
be doing it incorrectly. My argument is that it comes out to a bad result. ... My argument is
more with the statute than it is than [sic] anything else." !d. The Tax Commission presented no
other witnesses or evidence to support a finding that Cable One's income as reported did not
fairly represent its business activity in Idaho for tax year 2005.

The testimony of Mr. Peters is

not adequate to meet the Tax Commission's high "burden of showing that alternative
apportionment is appropriate."

Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 575, 83 P.3d at 119 (citations

omitted).
Cable One's application of the standard three-factor formula is not "unusual" because it
allows Cable One to exclude some of its sales revenue from the sales factor numerator. Cf Tax
Commission Br. at 38. Nor does Cable One's approach result in "a zero sales factor." Cf Tax
Commission Br.

at

38.

CONFIDENTIAL*** _

As

explained

above,

Cable

One

reported

***START

***END CONFIDENTIAL** in sales revenue for its
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Idaho sales factor numerator. (Joint Stip. of Exhibits and Facts

~

17, R. 000282). While Mr.

Peters would be "embarrassed" to exclude revenues from the sales factor numerator (Tax
Commission Br. at 38), the exclusion of revenue is the very result contemplated by the statute
and endorsed by numerous cases in which the taxpayer did exactly that. See I.C. § 63-3027(r);
see also, e.g., AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *14 (where the majority of costs of
performance were incurred in the state from which a multi state infrastructure was managed,
court held sales were properly excluded from the sales factor numerator of the market state
where the customers resided); Michiana, 2012 WL 5854453, at *5 (same). According to I. C. §
63-3027(r), sales are either deemed "in this state" or not. The result is all or nothing. Cable
One's determination that some revenue should be excluded from the sales factor numerator
pursuant to I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) does not result in a "zero sales factor" and is not an "unusual
fact situation" automatically triggering alternative apportionment. See Union Pacific, 139 Idaho
at 576-78, 83 P.3d at 120-22 (identifying an unusual fact situation to be one where the taxpayer
mixed two accounting systems, which overstated sales).
C.

How Cable One Is Taxed in Other Jurisdictions Does Not Justify Deviation
from the Strong Presumption in Favor of the Normal Three-Factor
Apportionment

How Cable One is taxed in other states makes no difference in determining whether
Cable One should be subject to an alternative allocation and apportionment in Idaho. Cf Tax
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Commission Br. at 36. 15 The sole issue here is whether Cable One complied with Idaho law in
calculating its 2005 income taxes; Cable One's tax liability in Idaho is not based on every other
state where Cable One does business. Calculation of the sales factor numerator under I.C. § 633027(r) turns solely on costs of performance, not on what revenue was or was not taxed by
another jurisdiction. I.C. § 63-3027(c)(2).
While Arizona may have statutes and regulations similar to those found in Idaho (Tax
Commission Br. at 37), each state interprets its tax laws differently. Gilmour Mfg. Co. v. Com.,
750 A.2d 948, 955 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) ("Gilmour asserts that to effectuate the purposes of

15

The Tax Commission alleges that "Cable One calls these sales 'Arizona sales' in their

Idaho return and does not include them; they then take the exact contradictory position and call
these sales 'Idaho sales' in their Arizona return and do not include them." Tax Commission Br.
at 4, 7, 36. The Tax Commission's claims are unsupported by the record. Cable One's witness
testified that Internet access service sales were excluded from its Arizona income tax return
because "there are interpretations of the statute that depending on the facts and circumstances
could be different by state" and that Cable One applied the cost of performance approach in
Arizona as interpreted by Arizona law. Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 135, line 15 through p. 136, line 10;
see also Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 145, lines 21-24; p. 147, lines 9-14 (refusing to admit Cable One's

Arizona tax return into evidence in response to Cable One's relevancy objection that "[w]hat
Cable One filed in Arizona in 2005 for its income tax purposes is not relevant to the State of
Idaho").
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the UDITPA of uniformity in state taxation laws, the challenged statutory provision should be
interpreted consistently with those of other states. This argument lacks merit because other
states have not interpreted similar tax provisions in a uniform way."), aff'd, 822 A.2d 676 (Pa.
2003). The Tax Commission is not tasked with reviewing Cable One's application of another
state's tax law. The sole issue in this case is whether Cable One's Idaho income tax liability is
calculated properly under Idaho law.

In Oracle, the Oregon Tax Court rejected the exact

argument the Tax Commission makes here finding that the characterization of income on
Oracle's California income tax return could not dictate or control how Oracle's income was to be
reported in Oregon. Oracle Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2010 WL 496945 (Or.

T.e.

Feb. 11,

2010). While the Oracle court noted that UDITPA is "premised on a goal of uniformity" and
courts have "sanctioned consideration of uniformity," the court found these "aspirational goals
and 'consideration' of such goals represent matters of policy, not law." Id. at *3 (emphasis in
original).

Accordingly, the Oracle court determined the question of how income is to be

reported "must be governed by" the law of the state where the return is filed, "not by some
judicially declared doctrine that may pervert the law in a given situation." Id. at *4; see also id.
at *3 (rejecting a ruling that "would require the court to become an expert in the laws of 49 other
states ... not only as set forth in the various states' statutes, but as those statutes are refmed and
clarified by years of judicial opinions").
Similar to the positions taken in the Oracle case, the Tax Commission argues for
application of alternative apportionment because "uniformity" requires a review of Cable One's
tax liability in Arizona to ensure a "market approach" is "applied uniformly" and sales are
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"included as sales in the state where each customer resided." Tax Commission Br. at 36. But
that is not the law in Idaho. The Idaho Legislature chose to adopt costs of performance instead
of the "market source" approach that the Tax Commission advocates here. In states that have
adopted a "market source" law, for example, sales of a service are deemed to be in the state "if
and to the extent the service is delivered to a location" in the state. See, e.g., Ala. H.B. 434, 2011
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2011) (amending Alabama law to move from costs of performance to
market source). As the Tax Commission's own witness indicated, if the Tax Commission prefers
the market source approach, it must lobby the Idaho Legislature, not this Court. (Tr. Feb. 27, p.
132, lines 13-24; p. 135, lines 4-7). The Tax Commission cannot use this case, or how Cable
One is taxed in Arizona, to advocate a market source approach through application of an
alternative apportionment.

Under Idaho law as it currently stands, Cable One's income tax

liability was properly calculated and the Tax Commission's speculations about what mayor may
not have been done in other states are irrelevant.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein and in its Opening Brief, Cable One respectfully submits
that this Court should reverse the District Court's legal errors and set aside its clearly erroneous
factual findings, and find that alternative apportionment is not available here as a matter of law,
holding that Cable One correctly calculated its 2005 Idaho income tax liability.
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